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Loan Corp.85 that exhibit extreme deference to legislative purpose are
given credence, alternatives to the rule will warrant little consideration
in the face of a rule replete with valid, justifiable objectives and the
support of a vast majority of cases.
However, the deferential manner in which a court might deal with
this issue should not preclude a reconsideration of the policy behind
DR 7-109(C). It is apparent that in many instances the prohibition
of the rule does render an injustice. If contingent payment to expert
witnesses were tempered by requirements that the payment be reason-
able and that there be full disclosure to the court, jury and opposing
counsel, such agreements could be permissible.
Although the decision in Person has no further jurisdictional reach
than the boundaries of the Eastern District of New York, it may spark
the ABA and state bar associations to institute changes in DR 7-109
(C). Total revocation of the rule would inevitably lead to abuses of
a privilege that should be reserved for exceptional situations. Retention
of the rule and its arbitrary and categorical denial of expert testimony
to those who cannot afford such testimony is itself an abuse of justice.
Difficulty of administration should not prevent the amendment of a rule
unyielding in its absolute denial of the only means an indigent plaintiff
might have for obtaining fair treatment at trial.
MICHAEL A. HEEDY
Taxation-The Twilight Zone of Charity: The IRS Denies Ex-
emption for a Free Tax Planning Service Under Section 501(c)(3)
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) exercises a major influence
over the development of public charities through its power to charac-
terize an organization as "charitable" under section 501(c)(3) 1 of the
85. 337 U.S. 541 (1948); see note 84 supra.
1. I.R.C. § 501 provides in part:
(a) EXEMPTION FROM TAxATIoN.-An organization described in subsec-
tion (c) . . . shall be exempt from taxation ....
(c) LIsT OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS. ....
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organ-
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Internal Revenue Code. An organization denied the protection of tax
exempt status normally suffers a severe shortage of income since con-
tributions given to it are not deductible as "charitable contributions"
under section 170(c)(2).1 Unless overruled by federal court deci-
sions or congressional action, the IRS determines whether the activi-
ties of a particular organization should be supported by tax exempt
public contributions. In Revenue Ruling 76-4423 the IRS ruled that
an organization that offers free personal tax planning services to those
who wish to make charitable gifts is not operated exclusively for chari-
table purposes, and hence does not qualify as a 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion. This restrictive ruling represents an overly narrow percep-
tion of the primary policy of section 501(c)(3), which is to encourage
charitable giving and can be viewed as inconsistent with previous in-
terpretations of the statute.
The organization discussed in Revenue Ruling 76-442 employed
a staff of salaried attorneys to provide its services. It did not charge
fees for its services although obviously its clients were generally not
indigent. The organization derived most of its income from public
contributions but was not affiliated with any particular charity or group
of charities. Rather, it encouraged its clients to give to charities of
their personal choice.4
The IRS focused on whether the organization could be considered
to serve a public rather than a private interest" and concluded that in
aiding individuals in tax planning the organization was providing a com-
mercially available service to people who could afford it rather than a
ized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activi-
ties involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation, (except as otherwise provided
in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political cam-
paign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
2. See 4 T. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION
§ 59.01(2), at 5903b (1976). The definition of organizations eligible to receive deductible
charitable contributions found in § 170(c)(2) mirrors the language of § 501(c)(3)
except that trusts are also eligible, the organization must be created in the United States
or under United States law, and, curiously, "testing for public safety" is not mentioned.
3. 1976-46 I.R.B. 12.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 13 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1959), which pro-
vides: "An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for charitable purposes
. . . unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.")
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charitable activity in the legal sense. 6 This private purpose was held
to be predominant although the public could benefit from funds being
made available to charity as a result. The public benefit was thought
to be tenuous; the fact that charitable gifts were contemplated in the
plans drawn up could not transmute such services into a charitable
activity.7
Case law and IRS ruling policy in this area must be understood
against the common law background of charity. The federal tax laws
have traditionally acknowledged that charities "lessen the burdens of
government"" by providing what government might otherwise be obli-
gated to perform. For this reason Congress has granted favored tax
status to charities and charitable giving. In this respect the Code is
no innovation; instead it generally incorporates the common law
principles of charity9 as developed mainly through the law of charitable
6. The IRS's working definition of "charitable" is found in its Regulations:
The term "charitable" is used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally ac-
cepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as limited by the separ-
ate enumeration in section 501(c) (3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may
fall within the broad outlines of "charity" as developed by judicial decisions.
Such term includes: Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged;
advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or
maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the bur-
dens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed
to accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood ten-
sions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend human and
civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community deterioration and
juvenile delinquency.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959). This definition includes some of the terms
other than "charitable" found in § 501(c)(3). See note 1 supra. The Code should be
understood as treating "charitable" as inclusive of these types of activities as well (since
all of § 170(c) is under the heading of CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEFINED), although
the full meaning of charity is not exhausted by any checklist of activities. See Reiling,
Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525, 526 (1958).
7. 1976-46 I.R.B. at 12, 13.
8. The definition of "charitable" in the Treasury Regulations scarcely differs in
substance from the classic definition formulated by Justice Gray of Massachusetts:
A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied
consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of per-
sons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education
or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by
assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining
public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.
Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1867). See also Statute of
Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4.
9. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959), quoted in note 6 supra ("The
term 'charitable' is used . . . in its generally accepted legal sense .... "); Reiling, supra
note 6, at 526; Thrower, IRS is Considering Far Reaching Changes in Ruling on Exempt
Organizations, 34 J. TAx. 168 (1971); cf. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157
(D.D.C.), afj'd, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (" 'strong analogy' can be derived from the general
common law of charitable trusts, at least for close interpretive questions"). But cf.
Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 987, 992 (1st Cir. 1940) ("Interpretation of the
word 'charitable' in a federal revenue act is a matter of federal, not local, law.").
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trusts. These flexible common law principles allow great latitude for
diverse organizations to be brought within the ambit of section 501(c)
(3). These very characteristics of flexibility and generality, however,
inhibit the development of concrete guidelines for eligibility under the
exemption and result in a certain inconsistency of interpretation. 10
Court decisions and revenue rulings often fulfill a rulemaking function
only by default. While organizations factually similar to organizations
previously ruled upon are likely to be analyzed and treated similarly,
articulable rules can be discerned only with difficulty. This result
is attributable to the inherently amorphous character of any conception
of what is charitable.
Another factor that further hampers the emergence of precise
rules is the frequent mandate from the federal courts that the charitable
exemption and deduction statutes, unlike other tax statutes, should be
liberally construed in the favor of the taxpayer in order to encourage
charitable activity. According to Judge Augustus Hand:
The policy of exempting these [charitable] corporations is firmly
established and has been continuously expanding ever since the
system of income taxation was adopted. The statute [predeces-
sor of section 501] should be read, if possible, in such a way as
to carry out this policy and not to make the result turn on acci-
dental circumstances or legal technicalities."'
In place of "legal technicalities" the courts and the IRS have closely
scrutinized proffered charitable activity in order to decide whether its
particular factual characteristics comport with abstract notions of what
is "religious, scientific, [or] educational . . . ." A broad construc-
tion of such charitable categories will generally result in an expansive
reading of section 501(c)(3).
One common touchstone that underlies this scrutiny and serves as
a prerequisite for a finding of charitability is the extent to which an
activity is conducted for the public benefit. 12  There are two aspects
10. See Reiling, supra note 6, at 525. In a sense it is fortunate that rigid rules
have not crystallized. Otherwise, the creative process of founding new types of charita-
ble activity might be curbed, or at least shunted into certain prescribed directions. A
Commissioner of the IRS once recognized the growth of innovative types of charitable
organizations. Thrower, supra note 9, at 168.
11. Slocum v. Bowers, 15 F.2d 400, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1926), af 'd, 20 F.2d 350 (2d
Cir. 1927). See also, e.g., United States v. Pleasants, 305 U.S. 357, 363 (1939);
Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1934); Threlfall v. United States, 302 F. Supp.
1114, 1118 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
12. The Code does not use the term, but it is implicit in Gray's definition of
charity as being "for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons." See note 8 supra.
The Regulations specify that a charitable organization must serve "a public rather than a
private interest." Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (d) (1) (ii) (1959).
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to this inquiry in the context of section 501(c)(3): on the one hand,
an activity must be "public" in that it benefits an indefinite number
of persons' rather than ascertainable individuals,"4 while on the other,
it must be of "benefit" to the community." Such a concept as "public
benefit" is of dubious utility without examination of those factual
patterns where public benefit has necessarily been found by virtue of
the granting of the exemption.' 6 Difficult cases arise where any per-
ceived public benefit is indirect or tenuous, as when some of the organ-
ization's activities are clearly not charitable. Examples of these pro-
blems are readily found in the treatment of legal or law-related organ-
izations. The facts that the advocacy element associated with tradition-
al legal services often injects an aspect of personal benefit into the
activity and that legal services cannot be easily placed in the separately
enumerated charitable categories give rise on occasion to strained apo-
logia for findings of public benefit. The legal aid society that provides
free services to indigent persons who could not otherwise afford them
is a type of legal service organization that readily qualifies under tra-
ditional notions of charity. This sort of activity is clearly subsumed
under charity in its most popularly understood guise, expressed in the
IRS's definition as "[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the
underprivileged.' Accordingly the IRS has always held such organi-
zations to be exempt.'
13. See note 8 supra; Estate of Carolyn E. Gray, 2 T.C. 97, 103 (1943). The
class to be directly benefited need not encompass the entire public. It is enough that the
community benefits by the aid given to the class. Id.
14. This also proscribes individuals from profiting by operating the organization.
The provision in § 501(c)(3) requiring that "no part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual" expresses this principle. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1959). Payment of reasonable salaries, how-
ever, does not violate the inuring doctrine. Mabee Petroleum Corp. v. United States,
203 F.2d 872, 876 (5th Cir. 1953).
15. The statute states that an organization must be "organized and operated exclu-
sively for . . . charitable . ..purposes." In actual practice this is satisfied by being
"primarily" or "dominantly" charitable. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (1959);
Passaic United Hebrew Burial Ass'n v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 500, 505 (D.N.J.
1963). It is more difficult to reach a consensus on the meaning of "primarily" in a
given situation than on "exclusively." This gloss on the wording of the statute serves to
add confusion to uncertainty. See Keir, What is a Charity: Statutory Definition;
Exclusively; Lobbying, in N.Y.U., PROCEEDINGS OF FOURTEENTH ANN. INST. ON FED.
TAX. 19, 22 (H. Sellin ed. 1958). "The basic question, however, as to the 'primary'
purpose of an organization is factual and not always of simple solution." Id.
16. Cf. Goldberg & Cohen, Does Higher Authority than IRS Guidelines Exist for
Public Interest Law Firms?, 34 J. TAx. 77 (1971) (the phrase "broad public interest"
adds little to case law or policy); Reiling, supra note 6, at 595 (whether the public
interest is served by an exemption is a matter of generally accepted opinion).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d) (2) (1959).
18. Rev. Rul. 69-161, 1969-1 C.B. 149. It is also considered charitable for a legal
1977]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In Revenue Ruling 72-55911 the IRS granted exempt status to a
legal aid society whose means clearly had personal benefit aspects, but
that were subsidiary to an overall charitable purpose. There the
purpose was to provide free legal services to low income residents of
economically depressed communities through subsidizing recent law
school graduates who were willing to commit themselves to such work.
The IRS ruled that although the organization provided professional
training and a salary to the interns, who were not themselves members
of a charitable class, the organization's principal purpose remained
charitable in view of the fact that the interns were to be the instruments
through which the charitable purpose was to be accomplished. 0 This
ruling thus stands for the proposition that personal benefit to individ-
uals, which is not of itself charitable, will not preclude a finding of a
primarily charitable purpose if the personal benefit is necessary for
the accomplishment of the charitable objectives.2 1  A charity may
work through indirection; a noncharitable activity may induce further
activity which is charitable-all for an overriding resultant charitable
purpose.
Such circuitous public benefit has also been found in the operation
of law libraries and the activities of bar associations. In United States
v. Proprietors of Social Law Library22 an organization was held to be
charitable as furthering an educational purpose even though use of the
law library that it operated was confined to dues-paying subscribers and
though law students were excluded altogether. The First Circuit ad-
dressed itself to the fact that the specialized learning offered by a law
library is not itself directly useful to the general public. It found in-
direct public benefit by reasoning that the opportunity for research in
the law by those in a position to affect or apply an understanding of
it helps to strengthen those principles of law on which government
aid society to post bail or pay bondsmen's fees for indigent persons accused of crimes,
Rev. Rul. 76-21, 1976-3 I.R.B. 5; Rev. Rul. 76-22, 1976-3 I.R.B. 6.
19. 1972-2 C.B. 247. The organization trained young lawyers, set them up in
practice and compensated them for three years. During this time they were required to
perform free legal services, and after three years were expected to have their own paying
practice and to devote a substantial amount of time to providing free legal services to low
income residents.
20. Id.
21. An alternative analysis could have been that subsidizing the interns was
equivalent to paying reasonable salaries to employees and hence did not violate the
inuring doctrine. See Mabee Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 203 F.2d 872, 876 (5th
Cir. 1953).
22. 102 F.2d 481 (1st Cir. 1939).
726 [Vol. 55
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rests-a process vital to the public at large.23  Self interest is even
more obvious and the finding of public benefit more strained in the
cases dealing with bar associations, Dulles v. Johnson24 and St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. United States, 25 in which charitable deductions for
contributions to such organizations were upheld under the estate tax
analogue of section 170(c).2 In each case, while some of the asso-
ciation's activities were clearly charitable (e.g. , publishing legal arti-
cles, extending legal services to the poor, educating laymen on the law),
others such as regulating the unauthorized practice of law, disciplining
the profession, and advocating legislation, presented the issue of
whether the bar associations were primarily protecting their own com-
mercial interests. Both courts found the regulatory function of the bar
associations to be in the public interest in the sense of helping to pre-
serve the integrity and competence of the legal profession, which serves
the public and in whom the public places its trust.2I Union Trust also
found that the social activities sponsored by the bar association, while
not in themselves charitable, were only incidental to the other chari-
table activities.28
23. Id. at 484; accord, Rev. Rul. 75-196, 1975-1 C.B. 155, which also points out
that the fact that users may derive personal benefit is just a logical by-product of the
educational process. The court also stressed the library's directly educational purpose in
that not only law books, but also books on government, history, and other general inter-
est topics were included, and that the class of beneficiaries was not small or closed in
that membership was open to others besides members of the bar. 102 F.2d at 483.
24. 273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960).
25. 374 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1967).
26. I.R.C. § 2055(a) (2).
27. 273 F.2d at 365-66; 374 F.2d at 436. "We think the government overempha-
sizes the incidental economic benefits and unjustifiably would taint with an accusation of
commercialism legal activity which is dedicated to the public good." Id. at 435.
Moreover, the court in Dulles found that what the bar association did in attempting to
influence legislation was not the "attempting . . . to influence legislation" proscribed by
§ 2055(a)(2) since it was only directed to form, clarity of expression, and the
legislation's relation to other law, rather than to the serving of any selfish motive. 273
F.2d at 367.
28. 374 F.2d at 438. Dulles and Union Trust may serve to illustrate that a finding
of public benefit may be as much an assumption as a conclusion. A given set of
ambivalent facts can be made to support either a positive or a negative finding depending
upon which aspect-public or personal-a court places its emphasis. The holding in
Union Trust, however, is tempered by an acknowledgement that each case turns on its
facts and that some bar associations might not qualify. 374 F.2d at 440. The IRS has
expressed its disapproval of these cases in denying § 501(c)(3) status to a bar
association and will not use them as precedents for exemption questions under this
section. Rev. Rul. 71-505, 1971-2 C.B. 232. Bar associations do qualify as exempt
"business leagues" under § 501(c)(6). Id. In the above ruling the IRS found such
activities as promulgating minimum fee schedules, directing programs aimed at making
the practice of law more profitable, and sponsoring social activities to be "substantial"
noncharitable purposes. This demonstrates that-as in the public-private benefit distinc-
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A recently developed form of legal services organization to which
the IRS has granted exempt status is the public interest law firm. The
requisite public benefit "9 derived from the features that distinguish this
type of law firm from an ordinary commercial law firm. To qualify,
such firms must pursue the interests of the public (such as environ-
mental issues or governmental abuses) in such a form that there is no
direct representation of the private financial interest of individual clients
(as through class actions or injunctions against government)." Further-
more they may neither solicit nor accept attorneys' fees from clients. 1
The exemption is denied if a public interest firm too closely resembles
a commercial firm. 2 Practically, this means that aside from having
to refuse fees, the firm must also ordinarily accept work only when the
individual interests are so diffuse that commercial firms would find it
economically unfeasible to accept the case.33
Another form of indirectly charitable activity that does not involve
legal services per se is assistance to charitable organizations for the pur-
pose of facilitating their charitable activities. These services are of
indirect public benefit in the sense that only charitable organizations
are directly served, but the public at large benefits from the resultant
increase in efficiency of the charities so served. Otherwise these
activities are closely akin to ordinary commercial services. In Revenue
Ruling 69-57234 an organization formed to construct and maintain a
facility to house member agencies of a community chest (all of which
were exempt under 501(c)(3)) was granted exempt status. 3 The
tion-the line between "substantial" and "incidental" is one more of emphasis than
substance.
29. This activity is charitable not because the viewpoints it may advance are
necessarily the most auspicious for the public as a whole, but because it helps to
illuminate the issues of significant public interest that might otherwise be ignored. Rev.
Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152, 153. See generally Goldberg & Cohen, supra note 16;
Note, TIze Tax-Exempt Status of Public Interest Law Firms, 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 228
(1972).
30. Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575, 576 (guidelines for issuing advance ruling
of exemption to public interest law firms).
31. Rev. Proc. 75-13, 1975-1 C.B. 662 (amplifying Rev. Proc. 71-39). They may,
however, accept out-of-pocket expenses or court-awarded fees from opposing parties.
Id.
32. See Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154, which denied an exemption to a firm
that charged and accepted attorneys' fees when clients were willing to pay. The fees
never exceeded actual costs and were much less than those charged by commercial
firms.
33. See Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152, 153.
34. 1969-2 C.B. 119.
35. What distinguished this organization from an ordinary landlord was that rental
income was only equivalent to operating costs (significantly below the fair market value
728 [Vol. 55
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provision of this facility was judged to further a charitable purpose by
encouraging coordination among the member agencies and aiding the
more efficient use of their labor resources, thus enhancing the perfor-
mance of their respective charitable functions.30 A comparable aid to
charity is the management or consulting service. In Revenue Ruling
71-52911 an organization formed to help 501(c)(3) charities manage
their funds more effectively was held to be performing a charitable
function itself.3
Against this background, those attributes of the organization in
Revenue Ruling 76-442 that would tend to obstruct a finding of chari-
tability are readily apparent. The essential reason for the negative
finding appears to be the refusal by the IRS to recognize the indirect
public benefit of increased charitable giving derived from the tax counsel-
ing services. As pointed out above, when an activity serves both a
private and a public interest, the conclusion as to which "predominates"
is largely a matter of emphasis.3 As in the bar association and law
library cases,40 individuals may receive a direct benefit, but that does
not necessarily preclude a finding that an indirect public benefit over-
bears the significance of the private benefit.
A narrow focus upon the act of tax planning or even of giving,
independent of the ultimate charitable use of the funds, would support
a finding that the organization's activity is not directly charitable.
Nevertheless, tax planning directly facilitates charitable activity through
of comparable office space) and that certain amenities were provided, such as a large
central meeting room for the free use of the lessees. Id.
36. Id. "The performance of a particular activity that is not inherently charitable
may nonetheless further a charitable purpose. The overall result in any given case is
dependent on why and how that activity is actually being conducted."
37. 1971-2 C.B. 234.
38. The fact that the organization was controlled directly by a membership
composed of exempt colleges and universities, was funded by capital received from these
institutions, and charged fees to its members of less than 15% of cost, distinguished its
service from that of a commercial consulting firm. Id. Other organizations providing
similar services, however, have been denied exemption as being too akin to a trade or
business. Rev. Rul. 69-528, 1969-2 C.B. 127. One basis of the denial was that if a tax
exempt organization performed such a service on a fee basis it would result in taxable
unrelated business income. Id. at 128. This infirmity was not overcome even when the
services were provided at cost and exclusively for exempt organizations. Rev. Rul. 72-
369, 1972-2 C.B. 245.
39. See note 27 supra. The IRS's position in the instant ruling that "[a]lthough
funds may ultimately be made available to charity as a result of the organization's
planning assistance to individuals, the benefits to the public are tenuous in view of the
predominately private purpose served by arranging individuals' tax and estate plans"
betrays this tacit bias. Rev. Rul. 76-442, 1976-46 I.R.B. at 13.
40. See notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra.
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serving a middleman function of bringing contributor and charitable
organization together. This function is analogous to that of those
organizations such as the consulting service and the landlord whose
charitable purposes are to promote the efficiency of other charitable
organizations4' and are thus inextricably intertwined and dependent
upon the existence of other organizations' charitable activities. 42
The direct benefit to the individual client derived from the organi-
zation's services should not of itself preclude a finding of charitability.
Directly apposite on this point is the ruling granting exemption to the
legal aid society that subsidized legal interns in order that they might
provide free legal services to the indigent. There, the IRS stated:
The fact that recipients of the organization's financial assistance,
the legal interns, are not themselves members of a charitable class
does not mean the organization is not operating primarily for
charitable purposes. The interns are merely the instruments by
which the charitable purposes are accomplished. Therefore, the
fact that they derive personal gain from the arrangement does not
detract from the organization's charitable purposes. 43
In the instant ruling the individual clients are analogous to the interns.
Since they are the contributors to charity, they are the indispensable
"instruments" for accomplishment of the charitable purpose of making
more funds available for charitable use. Without some support (i.e.,
personally advantageous tax planning) it is likely that they could not
be induced to give as much or at all to charity. The fact that clients
could afford legal tax planning services (whereas young lawyers could
not afford to work for free without starving) should not necessarily
mean that free tax planning is not indispensable to the furthering of
the organization's eleemosynary purpose. It is probable that high
income taxpayers who would make charitable gifts as part of their
estate and tax plans in any case would not avail themselves of this
service, but would instead utilize private firms. When large deductions
hinge on reliable tax advice high income taxpayers are likely to place
their trust in the commercial services of the tax bar rather than in free
legal services. The middle income taxpayers who have a desire to con-
tribute to charity, however, may be deterred from doing so if they have
41. See notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra.
42. Perhaps "meta-charitable" would be an apt description of this function. This
should be distinguished from the charity that dispenses funds through a second tier of
foundations and the non-exempt § 502 "feeder organization," which distributes its profits
to exempt § 501 organizations.




to retain high priced counsel in order to take advantage of the induce-
ments that the tax law provides for charitable giving.44
The IRS perhaps unduly emphasized the assumed ability to pay
on the part of the organization's clients in concluding that the "com-
mercial" nature of the service taints any charitable purpose.' 5 Whether
an activity is "commercial" and hence noncharitable entails a broader
inquiry than payment by clients, even though otherwise charitable
organizations, such as a public interest law firm46 and a charitable con-
sulting service,47 have been disqualified solely for receipt of fees. For
instance, the IRS distinguishes public interest law firms from commer-
cial law firms not only because they accept no fees, but also because
they perform work that commerical law firms ordinarily do not.4 8 Com-
merical law firms routinely engage in estate and tax planning on a pro-
fitable basis. In addition, tax planning in its most immediate context
benefits only the individual, not the public. Since any individual in
a position to avail himself of such services is almost certainly not indi-
gent, the organization could not be said to benefit the class of the "poor
and distressed" as the legal aid organization does in providing admit-
tedly ordinary legal services.49
Nevertheless, if the tax counseling organization's services would
for the most part be sought by those who would not otherwise seek
to retain tax counsel, then the argument that this service is "commer-
cial" is somewhat specious. The services performed by legal aid so-
cieties are also obtainable from ordinary law firms, but that fact alone
does not render them commercial. What the IRS seems legitimately
concerned with in Revenue Ruling 76-442 is not so much that a benefit
may inure to those who operate the service if payment is accepted, but
rather that its clients will abuse the service by obtaining free advice
and at the same time deduct any fees they might choose to pay5" for
44. In this respect, the provision of legal services for the middle income class of
citizens, who are in general not well provided for by the legal profession, could be viewed
as a directly charitable activity, though as yet there is no precedential support for this
proposition.
45. "The organization is providing commercially available services to individuals
who can afford them." Rev. Rul. 76-442, 1976-46 I.R.B. at 13.
46. See note 32 supra.
47. See note 38 supra.
48. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
49. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
50. The ruling does not state that the organization does in fact accept fees for
service. Nevertheless, the statement that it "does not require any payment for its
services" implies that it does not refuse such payment. Rev. Rul. 76-442, 1976-46 I.R.B.
at 12.
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these services as "charitable contributions" under section 170. Tax-
payers would be obtaining a deduction for learning how to obtain de-
ductions, a situation that would understandably displease the IRS.
Section 170 itself, however, is sufficient to prevent this undue advan-
tage even if the instant organization were granted exemption under
section 501(c)(3).
Since the definition of "charitable contribution" in section 170(c)
almost precisely parallels section 501(c)(3), 5 ' any deduction allowed
under section 170 must a priori be to an organization qualifying under
section 501(c)(3). Therefore, all of the considerations germane to
the latter section are encompassed by section 170 as well, with the ad-
ditional requirement that the proffered contribution not be made with
the expectation that the donor will receive a consideration for his pay-
ment. The concept of public benefit permeates section 170 as well:
a payment made for the receipt of a personal benefit precludes the con-
tribution from being charitable. The test is objective, centering not
on the donor's subjective intent, but rather on what he actually receives
for what he pays.52 The characterization of the payment made by the
donor or the donee is not determinative. If the benefits to the con-
tributor are not "substantial" then the deduction is allowed for the
reason that the benefits flowing to the public offset the benefits flowing
to the contributor. 3
An example of this categorization process is provided by Oppewal
v. Commissioner,54 in which a taxpayer's contributions to a religious
education society that operated a school supported entirely by public
contributions were held to be nondeductible when the taxpayer's
children attended the school.55 The First Circuit reasoned that the
payments should be regarded in substance as tuition since such pay-
ments, though not required, served the same function as tuition in sup-
porting the operation of the school. This focus upon value allows those
contributions that are in excess of the fair market value of the consid-
eration received to be deductible to the extent of the excess. 6
51. See note 2 supra.
52. Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146, 146-47 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967).
53. Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 423 (Ct. CI. 1971).
54. 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972), noted in 8 SuFF. L. REv. 349 (1974).
55. Id. at 1002. See Delong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962), for
another school contribution qua tuition case.
56. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 (deductibility of payments in connection
with participation in fund-raising activities for charity).
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
The IRS would clearly be justified under this judicially developed
principle of section 170 in disallowing deductions by the Revenue
Ruling 76-442 organization's clients for their donations to the extent
the value of the donations equals the cost of comparable tax planning
services. This action would substantially exorcise those dimensions of
commercialism and private benefit to which the IRS objected. Such
an approach would have been preferable to denying 501(c)(3) status
altogether, for the prior decisions and policy of section 501 would
support a finding by a federal court that the organization qualifies for
the exemption. Section 501 as manipulated in Revenue Ruling 76-
442 is simply too blunt an instrument for use in deterring individual
taxpayers from utilizing the charitable exemption as a subterfuge by
which otherwise nondeductible personal legal expenses are trans-
formed into charitable gifts. Section 170 could accomplish this result
more directly and with more finesse. Such an alternative approach
would permit the organization to continue to pursue its purpose of en-
couraging gifts to charity without imposing a tax burden of atonement
on the organization itself for the possible sins of its clients.
FRANK LANE WILLIAMSON
Zoning-Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp.: An Implicit Endorsement of Exclusionary Zoning?
In recent years there has been considerable uncertainty in the
federal courts about the precise nature of the equal protection standards
applicable to cases of allegedly exclusionary zoning.' Lower federal
1. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 799-800 (1969). Compare Comment, Challenging Ex-
clusionary Zoning, 10 RxCH. L REv. 646, 686 (1976) (courts will apply rational basis
test, so challenge will usually fail) and Comment, Does a Zoning Ordinance with Ra-
cially Discriminatory Effects Violate the Constitution? Metropolitan Housing Develop-
nent Corporation v. The Village of Arlington Heights, 7 Loy. Cm. L.J. 141, 157 (1976)
("steadily expanding limits of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
have now infringed on the formerly solid police powers of local governments to
determine land use") with Note, Challenging Exclusionary Zoning: Contrasting Recent
Federal and State Court Approaches, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 147, 157 (1975) (ordinance
that perpetuates residential segregation likely to fall, as federal court will apply strict
scrutiny test).
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